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ANTITRUST POLICY TOOLS & IP RIGHTS: 
 U.S., TRANSATLANTIC & INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS 
MARIANELA LÓPEZ-GALDOS* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper tracks recent developments in the United States and EU 
competition systems with regard to the different policy tools used to address 
matters arising from the intersection of IP and competition policies.  The 
analysis compares the enforcement and advocacy efforts carried out by the 
different antitrust agencies in the United States and EU. 
This Article first traces how different authorities with antitrust 
mandates in the United States have dealt with the issue of balancing the 
rights of standard essential patent holders with innovation driven public 
welfare. This article then looks at how the antitrust authorities are using 
their antitrust statutes (e.g. Section 5 of the FTA Act, merger review 
provisions) to tackle IP-rights-related issues that have tenuous connections 
to competition concerns. 
All of the above issues have been highlighted with the aim to bring 
attention to the spillover effects that these moves may have in the national, 
transatlantic and international context. 
 
 *   Principal Researcher at the George Washington University Competition Law Center 
(www.gwclc.com). The author is grateful for many useful comments from William E. Kovacic and Gargi 
Yadav. The views expressed here are the author alone. 
6 LOPEZ-GALDOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/16  9:42 AM 
442 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:441 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments in prominent competition jurisdictions raise the 
question as to whether antitrust laws are being used in an optimal manner 
relating to intellectual property rights (“IPRs”), particularly in the context of 
Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”).  Assuming that the leading 
competition regimes acknowledge that antitrust law is about promoting 
competition and ultimately consumer welfare, some of the recent case law 
involving IPR holders might be blurring this idea and sending the wrong 
message to other emerging competition regimes, particularly China. 
Given the way the European Union (“EU”) and the United States have 
been deciding IPR related matters, they seem to be deviating from the 
consumer welfare goal.  Furthermore, other jurisdictions, such as Japan, 
Korea and Canada, are revising their antitrust guidelines relating to standard 
essential patent (“SEP”) holders.  As a result, SEP holders will be considered 
liable for antitrust violations when seeking injunctions against FRAND1-
encumbered patent infringers or when renegotiating original FRAND terms 
to seek higher royalties.  These phenomena give rise to internal legal 
dissonance as well as ambiguity in the signals sent to the international 
competition regimes—especially the nascent ones and more particularly, 
China. 
Since the 1990s, the competition community has enlarged vastly, and 
there are currently more than 120 competition authorities.2  Many of these 
nascent competition authorities operated in the context of emerging market 
economies.3  Typically, younger competition authorities look up to more 
experienced jurisdictions in search of guidance regarding the 
implementation of competition laws in their home countries.4  In most of 
 
 1.  FRAND stands for “fair reasonable and non-discriminatory,” and the term refers to the 
voluntary licensing commitment instituted through an SSO for an IP right that is, or maybe become, a 
technical standard in a given industry. [CITATION]. The term “reasonable and non-discriminatory” 
(“RAND”) is also commonly used. Please note that the terms FRAND and RAND will be used 
interchangeably throughout this Article. 
 2.  William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1042-43 (2012). 
 3.  William E. Kovacic & Ben Slay, Perilous Beginnings: The Establishment of Antimonopoly and 
Consumer Protection Programs in the Republic of Georgia, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 15, 15-43 (1998). 
 4.  Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic 
Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 502 (2012); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and 
Consumer Welfare in Antitrust (Aug. 3, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1873463; Huffman, Symposium, Neo-
Behavioralism? (Dec. 23, 2010); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008); Barak 
Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011); Joshua 
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these nascent competition systems, competition regimes are not yet 
exclusively concerned about consumer welfare and the promotion of 
competition.5  In fact, in young competition regimes, several competition 
goals coexist, including over-arching latent political ones. 
Against this backdrop, it is alarming to note that leading jurisdictions 
with consumer welfare oriented competition systems misinterpret the 
antitrust norms in the context of IPR policies. This is a cause of concern, as 
many emerging competition systems might view the outcome of recent 
developments (in the mature competition systems) in IP and antitrust law as 
a validation to continue using competition norms to further nationalistic 
goals to the detriment of competition, IPR holders and, ultimately, 
innovation. 
Joshua Wright clearly phrased this problem in a recent speech where he 
described this phenomenon as “a dangerous signal of approval to emerging 
antitrust regimes that special rules for IP are desirable from a competition 
perspective and that business arrangements involving IPRs may be safely 
presumed to be anticompetitive without rigorous economic analysis and 
proof of competitive harm.”6 
This paper seeks to analyze the recent case law decided in the United 
States and EU that explores the interface between antitrust and IP. In order 
to appreciate the implications of such case law, this Article looks first at the 
legislative framework and case law in question, examines the available 
policy tools to address the extant issues and then mulls over the global 
spillover effects of such issues. 
II.  THE KEY CONCERNS OF THE ANTITRUST AND SEPS DEBATE 
The setting of standards for essential patents has become indispensable 
for the technology industry, as it allows interoperability that, in turn, spurs 
technological advancement. Smartphones, e-readers, tablets, laptops and 
every other technical gadget that is available in the market is the result and 
the sum of a considerable number of inventions that operate together within 
a system. To ensure the interoperability of each of the independent devices 
 
D. Wright, Symposium, Abandoning Antitrust Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based 
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241 (2012). 
 5.  See J.D. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION (Oxford 
University Press 2010). 
 6.  Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, F.T.C.,, Does the FTC Have a New IP Agenda?, Remarks at the 
2014 Milton Handler Lecture: “Antitrust in the 21st Century”, (Mar. 11, 2014). 
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when put together, SSOs adopt standards through voluntary consensus.7  The 
advantages of having standards set are straightforward. Once a standard has 
been adopted, the industry can design and invest in products based on the 
standardized technology to the benefit of innovation and consumers.8 
The patents of these standards become the so-called standard essential 
patents that are incorporated in the design of gadgets. SSOs typically 
mandate inclusion of patents in a standard by seeking a commitment from an 
SEP owner to license the technology on FRAND terms to ensure that hold-
ups can be precluded.9  Patent hold-ups may occur when an SEP owner’s 
bargaining power in negotiating royalties substantially increases after the 
technology has been included in the standard designs. In practice, high 
switching costs leave the patentee at the mercy of the SEP owner.10 
As a consequence, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the 
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (together, the U.S. Antitrust Agencies) 
have raised concerns regarding IPR policies. 
Some of the key issues that are at the crossroads of the debate are the 
following. Can an exclusion order of the International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”) in respect of SEPs adversely impact U.S. consumers, innovation 
and, ultimately, society’s future? Should the competition agencies review the 
acquisition of SEPs portfolios in the context of merger with a different 
standard than mergers that do not include SEPs? Should antitrust be used to 
scrutinize IPR-related contracts? What are the implications of these 
decisions for the institutional design of the agencies? 
To address many of the above questions, the U.S. Antitrust Agencies 
and the EU have employed different policy tools. In some instances, such as 
the matters involving equitable reliefs, the agencies have focused on 
advocacy tools. Differently, to deal with other concerns, the agencies have 
used enforcement tools. The option to choose either one of the policy tools 
has multiple implications analyzed below in Section 3. 
 
 7.  See F.T.C, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition, at 28, 197 (Mar. 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pd. 
 8.  See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 
CAL. L. REV., 1889, 1896–97 (2002). 
 9.  See Apple, Inc., v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see also eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 400 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that hold-up results 
when “an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as 
a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent”). 
 10.  See Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at.914. 
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A.  Concern 1: Antitrust to Police Contractual Opportunism 
1.  The United States 
The U.S. Antitrust Agencies have raised concerns regarding the current 
equitable reliefs available for patent owners in the United States. 
Specifically, they have particularly been unnerved about a grant of injunctive 
relief against SEP holders who wish to exploit the terms of patent in an 
extractive manner.11 
Given that the price of the royalties for the SEP is a subject of 
negotiation between the patent owner and patentee, and that such 
negotiations usually take place once a patent has been included in a standard, 
the SEP owners enjoy a strategic and almost monopolistic leverage when 
negotiating royalties for licensing. Further, the patentees cannot negotiate 
with SEP owners on an equal footing, as demand for SEPs far outstrips the 
supply. Consequently, circumstances become ripe for practicing contractual 
opportunism and potentially creating patent “hold-ups” despite the FRAND 
commitment. However, there appears to be little administrative or business 
recourse from such predicament, as any attempt to fix or cap the royalties 
using antitrust norms would be tantamount to violating the tenets of the free 
markets. 
Before jumping headfirst into the concerns and controversies relating 
to patent hold-ups by SEP owners in the United States, it would be useful to 
understand the institutional canvas on which such issues play out. 
In the United States, patent holders have two main forums where patent 
disputes are solved: the district courts and the ITC. Each of the forums 
requires different standards and provides divergent solutions to claimants’ 
patent rights. Since the duality of the U.S. system is at the heart of the U.S. 
Antitrust Agencies’ concern relating to patent hold-ups, it is critical to 
understand the institutional dichotomy in this regard.12 To this end, each of 
the litigation paths available to FRAND encumbered SEP is discussed 
summarily below. 
 
 11.  See Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential 
Patents: Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (testimony of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r 
of the FTC); Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential 
Patents: Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (statement of Joseph F. Wayland, Acting 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division). 
 12.  See FTC Report, The Evolving IP Marketplace (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pd. 
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a.  Litigation Before a District Court 
The U.S. Code (“U.S.C.”) empowers the competent courts to grant 
relief by way of an injunction when a patent infringement arises. In 
particular, 35 U.S.C. § 283 provides that “the several courts having 
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with 
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by 
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”13 
Up to about 2006, the district courts interpreted this statute favorably 
for the patent holders, in many cases immediately granting an injunction 
upon a finding of patent infringement.14 While granting such automatic 
injunctions, the district courts assumed that monetary damages could not 
adequately compensate for patent infringements.15 Owing to this practice of 
district courts granting quick injunctive relief upon establishment of patent 
infringement, the negotiating power of the licensee was significantly 
diminished. Consequently, in many instances, licensees were left with only 
two options: Either switch standards and incur heavy expenditures and 
delays, or pay high royalties despite the RAND commitments. 
In a watershed judgment decided in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to an appeal brought by eBay,16 and eventually overturned 
the Federal Circuit’s longstanding standard to automatically grant permanent 
injunctive relief against patent infringers.17  In the eBay case, the Supreme 
Court examined whether it was appropriate to grant automatic injunctive 
relief against patent infringers and concluded that it was not. In doing so, the 
Supreme Court adopted a new four-prong test that patent holders have to 
satisfy in order to obtain an injunction: 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by 
permanent injunction.18 
 
 13.  See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2015). 
 14.  See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, (Fed. Cir. 1983); Smith 
Int’l Inc., v Hughes Tool Co., 759 F 2d. 1572,  1574–76 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 17.  Id. at 395–96 (Roberts, Ch. J., joined by Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) 
 18.  Id. at 391. 
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The eBay judgment modified the litigation landscape19 for patent related 
cases as illustrated in the figure below: 
 
 
FIG. 1 
 
The eBay decision weakened patent holders’ bargaining power via the 
district court path, by requiring the patent holders to satisfy the equitable 
criteria laid down in the four-prong test. Consequently, patent owners could 
no longer expect to be granted injunctions as a matter of right; instead, 
injunctions became a matter of judicial discretion. 
Accordingly, as of date, a patent holder’s recourse to injunctions 
through district courts is substantially curtailed, and the strategic option to 
litigate before courts to seek better settlements has been limited. The latter is 
particularly important for non-practicing patent holders20 who try to abuse 
patent rights on the premises of obtaining injunctive relief, which would 
hardly meet the eBay test.21 
b.  Litigating Before the International Trade Commission 
The second option for patent holders is to claim their rights before the 
ITC. The ITC is a quasi-judicial federal agency responsible for taking direct 
action against unfair trade practices and determining the impact of imports 
on US industries. The ITC’s five areas of operations are: (1) import injury 
 
 19.  See Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent 
Remedies. 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 543–72 (2008). 
 20.  Non-practicing entities are defined as patent owners that do not make products but assert their 
patents against others. These companies may also be referred as “patent trolls.” 
 21.  See Miranda Jones, Permanent Injunction, A Remedy by Any Other Name is Patently Not the 
Same: How eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1035, 14, 1063–70 (2007). 
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investigations, (2) intellectual property-based import investigations; (3) 
research program; (4) trade information services; and (5) trade policy 
support.22 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 empowers the ITC to ban imports 
that, inter alia, infringe patents.23 Once default has been established, the ITC 
may seek immediate relief—an exclusion order, a cease and desist order or 
both—against the defaulting party.24 In issuing an order of foregoing nature, 
the ITC may consider the effect of such orders upon the public health and 
welfare, competitive conditions in the U.S. economy, the production of like 
or directly competitive articles in the United States, as well as U.S. 
consumers and public interest at large.25 
Given such broad discretion of the ITC, it is likely that stakeholders do 
not stand the eBay analysis, but wish to gain traction or likely seek 
jurisdiction before the ITC.  However, the likelihood of an import ban order 
from the ITC remains slim. 
In order to seek an import restriction before the ITC, patent holders have 
to comply with two preconditions. First, patent holders must prove that 
goods are being imported into the US. Second, patent holders must 
demonstrate that they developed activities related to the patent-in-suit in the 
US. Clearly, the two prerequisites restrict jurisdiction of the ITC to import 
related cases affecting the US industry. 
Ideally, this option should remain very limited for non-practicing 
entities, since the domestic industry requirement would not be met.26  But in 
1988, the legislature noted that non-practicing entities should be entitled to 
obtain remedies from the ITC,27 allowing non-practicing entities to continue 
to use the ITC litigation path.28 
 
 22.  See USITC, About the USITC, UNITED STATES INT’L TRADE COMM’N (last visited Mar. 21, 
2016), https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm 
 23.  See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (2004). 
 24.  https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us337.htm 
 25.  https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf 
 26.  See, e.g., 337-TA-694, USITC Pub. 4292  (June 22, 2011). 
 27.  See 132 Cong. Rec. H. 1782, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Apr. 10, 1986). 
 28.  The non-practicing entity Walker Digital recently filed a complaint before the ITC for patent 
infringement regarding Blu-ray disc players. It based its domestic industry allegations on licenses it has 
with companies that sell Blu-ray disk players that practice the patent-in-suit.  More details available at 
http://www.itcblog.com/non-practicing-entity-walker-digital-files-new-337-complaint-regarding-
certain-blu-ray-disc-players-relying-solely-on-licensing-activities-for-alleged-domestic-industry. On 
January 5, 2012, the ITC voted to institute the investigation against thirty-five entities, including LG, 
Panasonic, Samsung, Sony, and Toshiba. More information available at 
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2012/er0105kk2.htm 
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Recently, the Federal Circuit ruled on whether licensing efforts and 
litigation expenditures related to a patent-in-suit were sufficient to meet the 
ITC’s domestic industry requirement.29 The court held that “expenditures on 
patent litigation do not automatically constitute evidence of the existence of 
an industry in the US established by substantial investment in the 
exploitation of a patent.”30 
The figure below sets out different US authorities with jurisdiction over 
matters related to patent rights and their specific concerns. 
 
 
FIG. 2 
 
c.  The Federal Trade Commission’s Viewpoint 
In July 2012, Commissioner Edith Ramirez testified on behalf of the 
FTC before the US Senate and highlighted the FTC’s concern regarding 
ITC’s exclusion orders in favor of SEP owners.31 According to the FTC, the 
ITC is attracting litigation by patent holders that would have difficulties in 
 
 29.  John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc.  v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322 (June 24, 2011). 
 30.  Id. at 1328. 
 31.  See Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential 
Patents, Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (testimony of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r 
of the FTC); Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standard-Essential 
Patents, Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On the Judiciary (2012) (statement of Joseph F. Wayland, Acting 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice). 
Patent Holder
District Court
Money Damages
Injunctive Relief 
(eBay)
ITC
Exclusion Orders
Cease-and-
Desist Order
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obtaining injunctive relief in district courts after the eBay decision.32 It 
appears that the FTC disapproves of SEP owners litigating before the ITC 
and opines that the ITC’s failure to consider equitable factors when issuing 
an exclusionary order or refusing to grant monetary damages raises systemic 
risks. 
To solve this problem, the FTC proposed two main solutions. First, the 
ITC may grant relief to SEP owners under the broad public interest 
consideration criterion by considering public welfare, the competitive 
conditions in the US economy and US consumers when deciding whether to 
grant an exclusion order under § 337.33 
By relying on public interest premises, the FTC suggested the ITC could 
deny an exclusion order if the patent owner had not complied with its RAND 
obligations, including the duty to negotiate in good faith. Alternatively, the 
FTC proposed that the ITC delay the effective date of its § 337 remedies, 
subject to the parties mediating in good faith for damages for past 
infringement and/or an ongoing royalty for future licensed use. Moreover, 
the FTC argued in favor of limiting the injunctive remedies of SEP holders 
that had committed to RAND, especially given that the patent system would 
not be undermined: Patent holders would still have the possibility to seek 
damages for past infringements and other non-injunctive relief.34 Finally, if 
the ITC fails to consider competition as a public interest concern, the FTC 
may call Congress for a statutory amendment. 
d.  The Department of Justice’s Viewpoint 
Also, in July 2012, Joseph Wayland, an acting Assistant Attorney 
General in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, testified before the Senate’s 
Judiciary Committee, concerned about potential patent hold-ups arising from 
litigation before the ITC.35 Wayland suggested that the ITC “should continue 
to gather the types of information necessary to evaluate whether the statutory 
public interest factors counsel against the imposition of an exclusion 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (permitting the ITC to consider “the public health and welfare, 
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive 
articles in the United States, and United States consumers.”) 
 34.  Prepared Statement of The F.T.C. Before the U.S. S. Committee on the Judiciary Concerning 
Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Ord. to Enforce Standard Essential Patents (July 
11, 2012), www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/120711standardpatents.pdf. 
 35.  Regarding Oversight of the Impact on Competition of Exclusion Orders to Enforce Standards- 
Essential Patents, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. S. (July 11, 2012) (Statement of Joseph 
F. Wayland, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. Antitrust Division), 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/284982.pdf. 
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order.”36 Thus, the DOJ appears to tacitly support the ITC’s endeavor to 
consider FRAND-encumbered patent litigation under the public interest 
umbrella. 
According to Wayland, the appropriateness of exclusion orders reliant 
upon FRAND-encumbered SEP’s merits special attention for 
interoperability reasons.  The DOJ foresees potential patent hold-ups that 
could result in the exclusion of competitors from a market, and in higher 
royalties that eventually are passed on to consumers. 
As a solution, the DOJ has suggested that the ITC “ha[ve] the authority 
to stay the imposition of an exclusion order contingent on the infringing 
party’s commitment to abide by an arbitrator’s determination of the fair 
value of a license.”37 In other words, in cases where the issue at stake is 
limited to the determination of the FRAND terms, the DOJ proposes that the 
ITC delays the imposition of an exclusion order, and allows a third party to 
determine the licensing terms. 
More recently, the DOJ and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”)38 have published a policy statement expressing their concern 
about the potential impact of exclusion orders on the U.S. competitive 
conditions and consumers involving RAND-encumbered SEPs.39 These two 
agencies argue that injunctive relief remedies involving RAND-encumbered 
SEP patents should be determined on the need to provide for incentives to 
innovators to participate in standards-setting activities and the necessity to 
provide appropriate compensation to patent holders.40 
In the policy statement, the DOJ and USPTO both argued that public 
interest should preclude the issuance of such exclusion orders in certain 
cases.41 Moreover, the DOJ and USPTO urge the ITC to consider whether 
monetary damages would be an appropriate remedy for infringement of 
RAND encumbered SEP patents.42 Alternatively, and in the same line as the 
FTC, the DOJ and the USPTO suggest delaying “the effective date of an 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  The USPTO is the executive-branch agency charged with responsibility for examining patent 
applications, issuing patents, and—through the Secretary of Commerce—advising the President on 
domestic and certain international issues of intellectual property policy. 
 39.  United States Department of Justice & United States Patent & Trademark Office, Policy 
Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments 
(January 8, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJ-
PTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-8-13.pdf. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
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exclusion order for a limited period of time to provide parties the opportunity 
to conclude a F/RAND license.”43 
The U.S. Antitrust Agencies are concerned that “a patent holder may 
use the threat of an ITC exclusion order, or an injunction issued in district 
court, to hold-up or demand higher royalties or other more costly licensing 
terms after the standard is implemented that could have been obtained before 
its IP was included in the standard.”44 In particular, U.S. Antitrust Agencies 
have raised concerns in regards to the discrepancy of solutions offered by 
district courts and the ITC in SEP litigation cases. The U.S. Antitrust 
Agencies are antagonized by the possibility that SEP owners can obtain 
injunctions from the district courts; thus circumventing the equitable test for 
injunction laid down in the landmark eBay decision. This gulf between the 
approach to grant relief to SEP owners by the district courts on one hand, 
and the ITC on the other, has become more pronounced in recent cases.45 
According to the U.S. Antitrust Agencies, the ITC has become the 
preferred jurisdiction for patent owners to abuse their rights since 2006. As 
a consequence, SEP owners are awarded exclusion orders that substantially 
increase the costs of small components. Thus, royalties do not reflect market 
competition, but rather the price resulting from the hold-up.  Eventually, the 
patent hold-ups result in the increase of prices to the consumers, distort 
incentives to innovate and undermine the standard setting process. 
2.  The European Union 
The EU, as well as some of its member states, is confronting similar 
problems as the United States with patent hold-ups and injunctive reliefs. It 
is interesting to briefly analyze the policy options existing in some of these 
jurisdictions since the verdict of one court has a cascading impact in 
transatlantic litigation and businesses. 
a.  The European Union Approach 
The litigation culture of the United States is markedly different from 
the enforcement culture existing elsewhere, especially in the EU. In the EU, 
the European Commission (“EC”) regards antitrust enforcement policies, 
 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Prepared Statement of The F.T.C., supra note 34. 
 45.  See Third Party U.S. F.T.C.’s Statement on the Pub. Int., In re Certain Wireless Communication 
Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-
TA 745 (June 6, 2012), www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf; see In re Certain Gaming and 
Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-752, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf. 
6 LOPEZ-GALDOS - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/16  9:42 AM 
2016] ANTITRUST POLICY TOOLS & IP RIGHTS 453 
including antitrust investigations, as a sufficient tool to impede potential 
abuses from SEP owners. 
For example, in the Google/Motorola Mobility merger, the EC cleared 
the transaction, relying on the fact that the EC is empowered to investigate 
abuse of dominance cases and when such anti-competitive behavior 
surfaces.  In particular, the EC stated, “The Commission considers that 
Google’s incentives to use the threat of injunctions to forcibly extract cross-
licenses from good faith licensees are most likely to be constrained by the 
prospect of an investigation based on Article 102 TFEU.”46 
Nonetheless, the EC has also reiterated that if good faith negotiations 
fail, patent owners may seek injunctions. According to the EC, “[i]n the 
event licensing discussions fail, the SEP holder may ultimately take its 
counter-party to court and seek an injunction.”47 Therefore, in the EU, it is 
legitimate for the SEP holder to seek injunctions if the following two-prong 
test is met: (i) the licensor tries to negotiate in good faith with the licensee 
and (ii) the licensee is not willing to negotiate in good faith on FRAND 
terms.48 
Recent case law has brought some clarity on this front in the EU. In the 
Motorola decision of 2014, the court held that a refusal to license by a 
dominant company (EU law considers SEPs owners dominant by definition) 
would constitute a violation of Article 102 of the TFEU only in “exceptional 
circumstances.”49 Notably, those “exceptional circumstances” include the 
situation where an SEP owner commits to license SEPs on FRAND terms in 
the context of an SSO. 
Furthermore, the European Court will soon decide whether an SEP 
owner has the obligation to license if it has given a FRAND promise in the 
context of the Huawei v. ZTE case.50  The following table51 summarizes the 
EU context in relation to the availability of equitable relief for SEP owners. 
 
 46.  Google/Motorola Mobility Merger Procedure, COMP/M.6381 (European Comm’n 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Comm’n Decision addressed to Motorola Mobility LLC relating to proceedings under Article 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, at 
39985 (European Comm’n 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39985/39985_928_16.pdf. 
 50.  Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. v ZTE Deutschland GmBH, C-170/13 at *57-58 (CJEU 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d538681487d4074efbb18cd5
8cc2d504aa.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4OchaQe0?text=&docid=159827&pageIndex=0&doclang=en
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=487416. 
 51.  This table is copied from the OECD background material by Maurits Dolmans (Cleary 
Glottlieb, London) for Item VII of the 122nd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 17-18 
December 2014. 
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Table 1: Maurits Dolmans (Cleary Glottlieb, London) for Item VII of the 
122nd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 17–18 December 
2014. 
 
 
 
SEP Owner has offered 
a license on terms to be 
set by a court or 
arbitral tribunal 
SEP Owner has offered 
a license on specific 
terms, but has not 
agreed to be bound by 
terms set by a court or 
arbitral tribunal 
SEP Owner has not 
offered terms and 
refuses to submit to 
court/arbitration (and 
has not objective 
justification to refuse 
to grant a license) 
User has offered to 
take a license on 
terms to be set by a 
court or arbitral 
tribunal 
Injunction 
denied/irrelevant 
 
License terms are set 
by court or arbitral 
tribunal (and injunction 
request, if not 
withdrawn, is denied or 
suspended) 
Injunction suspended 
pending FRAND 
review, and granted if 
Court finds terms 
offered by SEP owner 
are GRAND and user 
does not accept 
 
Injunction denied if 
Court finds terms 
offered by SEP owner 
are not FRAND, or if 
the user accepts the 
FRAND terms the 
owner offers 
Injunction denied 
User has offered to 
take a license on 
specific terms, but 
has not agreed to be 
bound by terms set 
by a court or arbitral 
tribunal 
Injunction granted 
unless Court finds 
terms offered by user 
are FRAND and SEP 
owner does not accept 
them 
Same as above Injunction denied 
User has not offered 
to take a license (and 
has no objective 
justification to refuse 
to take a license) or 
user’s conduct is 
purely tactical and/or 
dilatory and/or not 
serious 
Injunction granted Same as above 
Injunction denied, 
unless user has 
explicitly refused to 
take a license, or user’s 
conduct is purely 
tactical and/or dilatory 
and/or not serious 
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Based on the table above, it appears that the injunctive relief to SEP 
owners in the EU is available only when there is an objective justification 
for seeking such relief. 
Notwithstanding the EC approach, the EU member states have adopted 
different approaches not always in line with the EC, as discussed below. 
Illustratively, Germany’s Mannheim Court allows parties to seek injunctions 
against SEP assertion,52 whereas in the UK, the High Court has ruled that an 
injunction should not be available to an owner of a SEP if there are FRAND 
obligations.53 
b.  The German Approach 
Recently, in a significant ruling in the realm of SEP patent infringement 
suits, the Regional Court of Mannheim (in Germany) allowed Motorola to 
seek an injunction against Microsoft when asserting patents related to a 
standard (the H.264 Video CODEC) applicable to Windows 7 and XBox 
360.54 The court ruled that “[FRAND] cannot be understood as a binding 
license offer to any number of third parties unknown to the plaintiff, 
requiring only acceptance by a third party, but is a request to license seekers 
to submit their own FRAND offers.”55 
Moreover, the Mannheim Court stated that a FRAND pledge does not 
constitute a 
waiver by the patent holder of injunctive relief as a means of enforcing its 
patent claims against an unknown number of potential patent infringers . . . 
a patent holder who submits a patent statement and licensing declaration 
form merely offers to waive its exclusivity rights under the patent by 
establishing a license agreement—and not unconditionally.56 
To prevent the enforcement of the German Court ruling, a U.S. district 
court ordered a restraining order barring Motorola from enforcing the 
Mannheim ruling.57 The appellate panel considered that the U.S. district 
court ruling did not infringe comity principles, since the litigation procedure 
 
 52.  http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html 
 53.  Foss Patents, UK High Court Denies Patent Injunction Against Nokia in Light of a FRAND 
Commitment, May 30, 2012, http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patent-
injunction.html. 
 54. http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html 
 55.  See, Foss Pats., The German Approach to FRAND: Let’s Err on the Side of Injunctions (May 
23, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/german-approach-to-frand-lets-err-on.html.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html 
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under the U.S. contract had been initiated before the German case was filed 
and both corporations were American.58 
Essentially, according to the Mannheim Court, when a SEP holder that 
made a FRAND commitment made some attempts to negotiate a license and 
such negotiations failed (whether or not those attempts were made in good 
faith), it can seek injunctive relief unless its actions constitute a violation of 
antitrust laws.59 To put it simply, the Mannheim Court contradicts the policy 
adopted by U.S. district courts after the eBay judgment and does not entirely 
comply with the EU’s policy since the German court does not mandate good 
faith negotiations.60 
c.  The UK Approach 
In the UK, the High Court refused an injunction to IPCom against Nokia 
in a dispute relating to a 3G standard called UMTS.61 In particular, the patent-
in-suit detailed how access channels are assigned to users in 3G networks.62 
Nokia lost the case, but notwithstanding the fact that the UK High Court 
asserted the validity of IPCom patents, it denied IPCom’s request for an 
injunction.63 
In particular, the UK High Court stated: 
I have to say in those circumstances I am very uncertain, to put it mildly, 
to see why a permanent injunction should be granted in this case at all or 
indeed any injunction. It seems to me a classic case for consideration of 
the [Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co] criteria, given these 
circumstances. You are willing to give a license. Nokia wants to get a 
license. You cannot agree on the terms. They will be determined. There 
will then be a license. In those circumstances for a non (unclear) to get an 
injunction seems to me quite extraordinary. That has been raised in the 
written arguments. It seems to me that is the area which I would like you 
to address me because that may resolve this matter quite apart from all 
these difficult questions of what the different German judgments mean 
and which principles of res judicata should be applied. It comes down then 
 
 58.  http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/us-court-extends-ban-motorola-cant.html 
 59.  http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/frand-abuse-german-court-hands-motorola.html 
 60.  See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest 19 
fig. 3 (Cornell Law Rev. 2012, Stanford Law Working Paper No. 2022168), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2022168. The statistics show a drop from a grant 
rate of about 95 percent pre-eBay to about 75 percent post-eBay. 
 61.  Nokia GmbH v IPCom GmbH & Co. KG, [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch) (May 18, 2012). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patent-injunction.html 
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to the discretion of this court whether it is appropriate to grant an 
injunction at all.64 
The fact that IPCom is a non-practicing entity might have influenced the UK 
High Court’s decision. 
The Shelfer case is an old ruling that established the test used to decide 
when injunctive relief may be denied because monetary compensation is 
sufficient.65 There are considerable similarities between the Shelfer and the 
eBay rulings.66 
Despite what the UK High Court Judge stated in Nokia v. IPCom, the 
Shelfer jurisprudence holds in the UK, even though it is not an exhaustive 
test. In fact, the debate over public interest and equitable relief still persists 
in British courts, as UK Courts have adopted different approaches to the 
debate over public interest. In some instances, the courts have considered 
granting injunctive relief for public interest reasons.67  In other instances, 
however, the UK courts have considered that the Patent Act was sufficient 
to protect the public interest.68 
B.  Concern 2: Breach of FRAND Commitments as an Antitrust Violation 
The FTC argues that in the post-eBay judgment era, patent litigation has 
shifted from district courts to the ITC, which remains a more favorable 
jurisdiction for SEP owners.69  The debate over the ITC’s usage of public 
interest considerations in its decisions leads to a more general follow up 
question pertaining to the appropriateness of the antitrust competition 
agencies to discuss FRAND-encumbered SEPs disputes. 
 
 64.  Foss Pats., UK High Ct. Denies Pat. Injunction Against Nokia in Light of a FRAND 
Commitment (May 30, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patent-
injunction.html. 
 65.  Shelfer v. City of London Elec. Lighting Co., 1 Ch 287 *304 (1984). 
 66.  Id. (holding that damages may be awarded if a four prong test is met: (i) the injury to the 
claimant’s legal rights must be small; (ii) it must be capable of being estimated in money; (iii) it must be 
adequately compensated by a small money payment; and (iv) the case must be one in which it would be 
oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction). 
 67.  See, e.g,. Roussel-Uclaf v. G. D. Searle and Co. Ltd., F.S.R. 125 (High Ct. of Just., Chancery 
Division 1976) (holding that when the infringing product is a unique, lifesaving drug, “it is at least very 
doubtful if the court in its discretion ever ought to grant an injunction and I cannot at present think of any 
circumstances where it should”) 
 68.  See, e.g. Chiron v Murex (Aldous, J.) (stating the patent act was sufficient to protect the public 
interest). According to the court it was inherent in the patent system that patents would sometimes impede 
research, and the research exception in the Patents Act of 1977 was sufficient to protect the public interest, 
more information available http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/28371/injunctions-english-
patent-litigation-big-thing-small-winner-takes-all. 
 69.  The FTC nonetheless quotes a study that refers to the triplication of patent challenges in the 
past ten years due to imports rather than for reasons related to the eBay judgment. 
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When a patent owner commits to FRAND licensing, it implicitly 
acknowledges that a royalty is adequate compensation for a licensee to use 
that patent. In other words, FRAND-encumbered patent owners assume that 
their ultimate goal, for which they engage in such commitments, is to obtain 
monetary compensation. Therefore, the use of remedies other than monetary 
damages should remain residual. However, antitrust authorities both in the 
United States and in the EU have used competition concerns to challenge 
conduct relating to SEP in the context of the standard setting process.  As 
discussed later, the U.S. FTC has relied on Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”) to police some corporations with regards to 
the IPR policies.70 In contrast, in the EU, the EC and other national 
authorities rely on the broader EU legislation to sanction particularly 
dominant firms for IPR related infringements. 
1.  The United States 
The U.S. Agencies have traditionally relied on the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act as its primary antitrust enforcement tools. The FTC, however, 
has also made use of the FTC Act provisions as an additional enforcement 
tool. In particular, the FTC has authority to bring, among other things,71 
administrative proceedings challenging “unfair methods of competition”—
including conduct that violates § 2 of the Sherman Act—under § 5 of the 
FTC Act. 
In theory, an SEP owner’s licensing practices could be addressed under 
both § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the FTC Act. However, taking U.S. 
Supreme Court cases into consideration, it is difficult to imagine that an SEP 
owner would be found liable under § 2 of the Sherman Act. To overcome 
this enforcement challenge, the FTC has been relying on § 5 to bring stand-
alone actions, including those against SEP owners. 
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits both “unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices” and “unfair methods of competition,” without further detailing 
practices that belong under each of those categories.72 The FTC has recently 
 
 70.  15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 71.  The FTC can also issue a cease and desist order and seek enforcement of that order, including 
civil penalties and injunctive relief, in federal court. Additionally, the FTC may apply for injunctive relief 
pending adjudication of its own administrative complaint or, in a “proper case,” for permanent injunctive 
relief against entities that have violated or threaten to violate the laws it administers. William E. Kovacic 
& Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929 (2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/competition-policy-and-
application-section-5-ftc-act-marc-winerman/2010kovacicwinermanpolicyapp.pdf. 
 72.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
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made some efforts to issue some form of guidance on the scope of § 5 of the 
FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition.”73 Despite some 
efforts devoted to the clarification of which anticompetitive practices can be 
sanctioned under § 5, the lack of clear and substantive guidance allows the 
FTC to expand its use to certain practices.74 However, from a strategic 
viewpoint, this expansion might have a boomerang effect against the FTC as 
the leading U.S. antitrust institution (shifting to the DOJ as the preferred 
institution) and internationally.75 
In November 2012, the FTC stated, “Patent holders that seek injunctive 
relief against willing licensees of their FRAND-encumbered SEPs should 
understand that in appropriate cases the Commission can and will challenge 
this conduct as an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.”76 This statement was made in the context of the Robert Bosch GmbH 
acquisition of SPX services from SPX Corporation.77 But earlier than 2012, 
the FTC had already reached several settlements with corporations based on 
the underlying principle that § 5 of the FTC Act could be used to sanction 
businesses for carrying out anticompetitive practices.78 In 1996, the FTC had 
its first case showing a willingness to expand the use of § 5 to enforce 
antitrust in the IPR field.79 This very first case involved Dell Corporation, 
that had “certified” that it had no IP on a computer related standard, and later 
 
 73.  FTC Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act (2015); Joshua D. Wright & Angela Diveley, Unfair Methods of Competition 
After the 2015 Commission Statement, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (2015). 
 74. DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735371/150813ohlhausendissentfinal.pd
f (relating to the FTC statement of enforcement principles regarding “unfair methods of competition” 
under section 5 of the FTC Act). 
 75.  15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). Section 5 prohibits entities from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in interstate commerce, and states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. 
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or 
corporations, [except certain specified financial and industrial sectors] from using unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce. 
Id. 
 76.  See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Statement of the Fed. Trade Commission, FTC File 
Number 121-0081, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf. 
 77.  See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Decision and Order of the FTC in the Matter of 
Robert Bosch GmbH FTC File Number 121-0081, 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf. 
 78.  See M. Sean Royall, The Role of Antitrust in Policing Unilateral Abuses of Standard-Setting 
Processes, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2004, at 44-–49, 
http://www.lawseminars.com/materials/08NDATATB/ndatatb%20m%20Royall.pdf. 
 79.  See In the Matter of Dell Computer Corp., FTC No. C-3658, 1996 FTC LEXIS 291 (Decision 
and Order) (May 20, 1996). 
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challenged a standard under § 5 on the ground that its technology was being 
used.80 The FTC concluded that Dell had misled the SSO, due to its failure 
to disclose its IPRs.81  Eventually, the parties settled, and Dell agreed not to 
collect royalties when its patent was used in the standard.82 
Following the Dell settlement, the FTC continued with its efforts to 
expand the use of § 5 in the N-Data case,83 which was eventually settled.84 
The FTC considered that N-Data had engaged in post-contractual 
opportunism by not honoring a promise to license patents that had been 
adopted as a standard.85 According to the FTC, N-Data was trying to extract 
higher royalty fees once its technology had been widely adopted, and these 
practices constituted violations of § 5.86 
More recently, in 2012, the FTC issued a decision and ordered against 
Bosch.  The FTC used as a legal basis the FTC’s  § 5 on the basis of a breach 
of a commitment to license SEP to standard.87 Briefly, Bosch had committed 
to licensing patents that were necessary to a standard in an air conditioning 
related technology.88 The Bosch decision followed the FTC’s N-Data 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81. See  Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 618 (1996) (Complaint, Decision, and Order)], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 1999/08/9823563c3888dell.htm. 
 82.   Id. 
 83. See In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 0510094 (Jan. 23, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080923ndsdo.pdf. 
 84.   See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 051 0094 (Decision and Order) (Jan. 23, 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122do.pdf 
 85.  Dissenting Statement of Chairman Majoras, In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, 
FTC No. 0510094, (2008). 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122majoras.pdf. Chairman Majoras 
argues that the facts did not support antitrust liability because, in her view, N-Data’s actions were 
consistent with IEEE policy and practice. Id. In addition, Chairman Majoras questioned whether “N-Data 
enjoyed measurable market power” through its NWay patents, concluding instead that NWay was an 
“optional technique” for Ethernet manufacturers. Id. In any event, the industry was partly to blame for N-
Data’s position because no company had sought a license to use NWay prior to Vertical’s 2002 “revision” 
of National’s promise. Id. In short, Chairman Majoras’s findings of fact were very different than the facts 
described by the Commission majority. Commissioner Kovacic, writing separately, concluded that N-
Data’s conduct did not violate Section 5 of the FTC Act, but did not comment on whether Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act applied. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner William E. Kovacic, In the Matter of 
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 0510094, (2008). 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122kovacic.pdf. 
 86.  See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In the Matter of Negotiated 
Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. 051 0094, at 4 (Jan. 23, 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122analysis.pdf. 
 87.  See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Decision and Order of the FTC In the Matter of 
Robert Bosch GmbH FTC File Number 121-0081, 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf. 
 88.   See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Decision and Order of the FTC In the Matter of 
Robert Bosch GmbH FTC File Number 121-0081, 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf. 
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Consent Order that noted that “the Supreme Court has not hesitated to 
impose antitrust liability on conduct that threatens to undermine the 
standard-setting process or to render it anticompetitive.”89 Finally, in 2013, 
the FTC issued a consent order in an investigation of Google, and ratified a 
consent decree that contained only some commitments from Google to 
modify certain elements of its business and no other provisions of legal 
consequence.90 With such a consent order, both the FTC and Google avoided 
the long winding litigation route. 
The FTC has also confronted cases where § 2 of the Sherman Act was 
used to target IP related monopolizations. In 2003, in the UNOCAL case, the 
FTC determined through an administrative complaint that the company had 
wrongfully acquired monopoly power, attempted to monopolize and 
unreasonably restraint trade.91 The FTC opined that UNOCAL manipulated 
the standard setting process by persuading the Board of California Air 
Resources to adopt certain standards at the same time that it acquired certain 
patents overlapping with those standards.92 The FTC prevented UNOCAL 
from enforcing such patents.93 It was not until 2005, in the context of a 
merger with Chevron Corporation, that UNOCAL agreed with the FTC not 
to enforce the relevant patents.94 
One year later, in 2006, the FTC found that RAMBUS violated § 2 of 
the Sherman Act, because it failed to disclose certain pending patents 
applications to the SSO, in order to monopolize markets for computer 
memory technologies that were included in the standard.95 In other words, 
the FTC alleged that a deception or failure to disclose an SEP before the 
SSOs constituted a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.  The FTC considered 
that two other scenarios could have existed, had it not been for RAMBUS’s 
strategy to deceive the SSO: either (i) the SSO would have selected an 
alternative non-proprietary technology different from the one included in 
RAMBUS’ patents or (ii) if the SSO had chosen RAMBUS’s technology, it 
 
 89.  See https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/01/080122analysis.pdf 
 90.  In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC, FTC No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013),  
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaagree.pdf. 
 91. See In the Matter of Union Oil Co., FTC Docket No. 9305 (July 7, 2004), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/07/040706commissionopinion.pdf. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.   Id. 
 94.  See Joseph Farrell, et. al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 
603, 607 (2007), http://eml.berkeley.edu/~farrell/ftp/FHSS_ALJ_2007.pdf. 
 95.  See Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, No. 08- 694, 2009 WL 
425102 (Feb. 23, 2009), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/2008%20Rambus.pdf. 
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would have demanded a commitment to license its technology on FRAND 
terms.96 
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the case and ruled in favor of RAMBUS, as 
it considered that RAMBUS could only be held liable under the first 
scenario.97 Eventually, in an appeal to the Supreme Court, the FTC lost the 
case, because the Court denied the certiorari.98 As a result, the FTC’s ability 
to use § 2 of the Sherman Act to build a case of antitrust based on IP matters 
remains limited.99 
In contrast to the RAMBUS decision, Qualcomm v. Broadcom 
foreshadows the possibility of a corporation being held liable under § 2 of 
the Sherman Act for failure to license its technology under FRAND terms.100 
Broadcom filed a case against Qualcomm, alleging that the latter was 
violating the FRAND terms when licensing its technology previously 
incorporated through an SSO.  The district Court dismissed the complaint.101 
But, on review, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the dismissal, 
and reinstated the case.102 Eventually, the Third Circuit decided that: 
the [N.J. District] Court reasoned that Qualcomm enjoyed a legally-
sanctioned monopoly in its patented technology, and that this monopoly 
conferred the right to exclude competition and set the terms by which that 
technology was distributed. . . . [T]he inclusion of¯. . . [the] technology in 
the [] standard did not harm competition because an absence of 
competition was the inevitable result of any standard-setting process.103 
2.  The European Union 
The resolution of cases involving SEP in the context of SSOs in the EU 
differs from the U.S. evolution of the FTC’s settlements. The main reason 
for this divergence is the fact that EU competition laws in this context are 
broader than § 2 of the Sherman Act. The flexibility available to the EU 
competition courts in FRAND-encumbered SEPs is responsible for this 
chasm in the transatlantic systems’ approaches. In the EU, the spectrum of 
practices that Article 102 of the TFEU grants gives more flexibility to the 
 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: The 
Rambus and Broadcom Decisions, 28 U. IOWA LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 08-25 (July 20, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138002. 
 100.  See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311, 312 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 101.   See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., “Qualcomm II”, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 911 (S.D. Cal. 
Jan. 7, 2008). 
 102.  See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311, 312 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 103.  Id. at 305 (internal quotations omitted). 
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EC to use competition law to rule over FRAND of SEPs in the context of 
SSOs.104 
In 2007, similar to the case filed by the FTC, the EC opened a case 
against RAMBUS for breach of Article 102, TFEU.105 The EC considered 
that RAMBUS was seeking unreasonable royalties for the use of patents in 
the computer memory chips market, and as such, was abusing its dominant 
position. In parallel to the U.S. litigation, the EC claimed that “by not 
disclosing the existence of the patents which it later claimed were relevant 
to the adopted standard” Rambus may have committed a form of “patent 
ambush.”106 In addition, the EC stated that “by subsequently claiming 
unreasonable royalties for the use of those relevant patents,” RAMBUS had 
abused its dominant position. 107 RAMBUS settled the case with the EC and 
agreed to cap the royalties for its new technology and to license older patents 
at no cost.108 
In 2005, Broadcom, Ericsson, NEC, Nokia, Panasonic Mobile 
Communications, and Texas Instrument Search lodged complaints with the 
EC against Qualcomm, which holds certain essential patents in the standard 
for mobile telephones.  The complaint was based on the allegations that 
Qualcomm violated the FRAND terms to which it had agreed, in the context 
of the SSO relating to the chipset downstream markets.  The EC closed 
investigations without taking action, because the EC could not prove that the 
license fees were unreasonably high.109 
More recently, the question of compulsory licensing has been reviewed 
by the Court of Justices, in the ZTE-Huawei case.110 The case concerns the 
question of whether an action for infringement brought by the holder an SEP 
who has committed to granting licenses on FRAND terms constitutes an 
abuse of a dominant position. The Advocated General Wathelet opined: 
 
 104.  See Piotr Staniszewski, The Interplay Between IP Rights and Competition Law in the Context 
of Standardization, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 666, 671 n.52 (2007) (“In contrast to US law, Art 81 
and 82 EC do not require an element of intention to prove anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 105.  See Commission Decision (EC),  Case COMP/38.636 - Rambus, of 9 Dec. 2009, art. 102, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38636/38636_1203_1.pdf. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  https://www.rambus.com/european-commission-accepts-rambus-commitments-in-final-
settlement/ 
 109.  See Standard Essential Patents and Injunctive Relief, JONES DAY (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/77a53dff-786c-442d-8028-
906e1297060b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/270fc132-6369-4063-951b-
294ca647c5ed/Standards-Essential%20Patents.pdf. 
 110.  See Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1160150. 
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In order to honor that commitment and to avoid abusing a dominant 
position, the SEP holder must, before making a request for corrective 
measures or seeking an injunction, alert the infringer to the infringement 
at issues in writing, giving reasons, and specifying the SEP concerned and 
the way in which it has been infringed by that company, unless it has been 
established that the alleged infringer is fully aware of the infringement. 
The SEP holder must, in any event, present the alleged infringer with a 
written offer of a licence on FRAND terms and that offer must contain all 
the terms normally included in a license in the sector in question, including 
the precise amount of the royalty and the way in which that amount is 
calculated.111 
In July 2015, the Court of Justice admitted that an antitrust violation 
could exist under EU law when seeking injunctive relief relating to a 
FRAND-encumbered SEP.112 That said, in it’s decision, the Court of Justice 
adopted a safe harbor that foresees several requirements that, if met, would 
exclude injunctive relief seekers from liability.113 In detail, FRAND-
encumbered SEP holders would be required to take the following steps 
before they seeking injunctions against potential infringers without violating 
EU competition law: 
1. SEP holders must alert SEP users of the alleged infringement; 
2. SEP users must indicate a willingness to conclude a license on 
FRAND terms; 
3. SEP holders must present a detailed written offer for a license on 
FRAND terms; 
4. SEP users must respond promptly and in good faith, and not engage 
in delaying tactics; 
5. If the SEP user does not accept the offer, it must submit, promptly 
and in writing, a specific counter-offer on FRAND terms; 
6. If no agreement is reached, an SEP user that is already using the 
technology must provide appropriate security and be able to render 
accounts; 
7. The amount of the royalty may, by common agreement, be 
determined by an independent third party; 
8. SEP users can challenge validity, essentiality, and infringement in 
parallel to licensing negotiations and also after conclusion of the 
license agreement.114 
 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
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In view of the foregoing, it may be concluded that the Court of Justice 
has been tempted to adopt a middle ground position by balancing SEP 
owners and licensees’ interests. In other words, FRAND-encumbered SEP 
owners will continue to have the right to seek injunctions, but with 
limitations. 
The long awaited judgment raises many questions as to the 
implementation of the safe harbor and the role that national courts will play 
in such respect. Nonetheless, the balancing position adopted by the European 
Court of Justice is a better option than completely eliminating the right to 
seek injunctions to SEP owners that have committed to FRAND terms. In 
this sense, nascent jurisdictions focusing on the same matter should consider 
the European approach if the only alternative is to consider seeking 
injunctions a per se violation of antitrust norms with respect to FRAND-
encumbered SEP owners. 
C.  Concern 3: Abusing Merger Review Involving SEPs 
Merger review procedures exist as a part of almost every competition 
system as an enforcement mechanism preventing anticompetitive 
transactions from materializing in the markets. Typically, corporations are 
required to file a merger before the relevant authorities when the deals meet 
the notification thresholds. However, recent developments, and in particular 
the Bosch and Google decisions, have removed the FTC’s blinkers in such 
matters and have revealed that the U.S., authorities and eventually the EU 
authorities might utilize merger review processes to tackle IPR issues. 
1.  The United States 
In Bosch, it is interesting to note that the FTC admitted to deciding to 
tackle the SEP issues together with the clearance of the proposed merger.115 
But the key question that remains is whether the FTC would have been 
concerned about Bosch’s IPR issues if it had not been for the Hart-Scott 
Rodino (“HSR”) filing.116 
Shortly after Bosch, the FTC again resorted to its merger review powers 
to tackle certain SEP issues of Google’s subsidiary, Motorola Mobility.117  
 
 115.  See In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, FTC 
File Number 121-0081, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf. 
 116.  Elyse Dorsey & Matthew R. McGuire, How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and 
Outcomes of Frand Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2252006. 
 117.  Motorola Mobility LLC, FTC File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolado.pdf. 
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Here, the FTC concluded that Motorola Mobility had infringed § 5 of the 
FTC Act because it had not honored its licensing commitments to the 
SSOs.118 In particular, the FTC determined that Motorola Mobility was in 
breach of its FRAND commitments by filing a case before the ITC seeking 
injunction and exclusion orders.119 Therefore, again, the FTC used its 
mandate to review mergers to address IPR issues and expanded the usage of 
§ 5. The case was settled.120 
The resolution of Bosch and Motorola Mobility represent the 
increasingly aggressive attitude of the FTC towards the SEP in SSOs that 
may eventually lead more and more to transactions being refused clearance 
on grounds other than competition related concerns. Recent policy changes 
by the FTC in HSR filings in the pharmaceutical sector edify the notion that 
the FTC is tightening the merger clearance noose in deals involving patent 
acquisitions.121 Notably, the FTC has recently changed its policy regarding 
exclusive patent license transfers in the pharmaceutical sector. As of 2013, 
licenses providing an exclusive licensee with “all commercially significant 
rights” over a patent in a particular therapeutic field will have to file an HSR 
filing before the FTC.122 Previously, only a limited number of license 
transfers that involved the right to make use and sell certain products had to 
be reported to the antitrust authorities.123 By this shift in its policy, the FTC 
that typically reviews deals in the healthcare sector is expanding its 
jurisdiction over transactions involving patents. In light of the lack of 
detailed guidance on which pharmaceutical deals will have to be reported to 
the antitrust authorities, many corporations might decide to file the HSR 
filing as a precautionary measure. These corporations, in turn, and in view 
of the Bosch and Motorola Mobility outcomes, risk facing a more stringent 
scrutiny from the FTC. 
There is a significant difference in the policy the DOJ adopted when 
reviewing mergers involving SEPs. In fact, the DOJ published a statement 
announcing the closing of its investigations into the Google/Motorola 
 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Press Release, FTC, FTC Finalizes Amendments to the Premerger Notification Rules 
Related to the Transfer of Exclusive Patent Rights in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Nov. 6, 2013),  
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/11/ftc-finalizes-amendments-premerger-
notification-rules-related. 
 122.  See Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 78 FED. REG. 68705 
(Nov. 15, 2013) (to be codified 16 CFR pt. 801), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/11/15/2013-27027/premerger-notification-reporting-and-
waiting-period-requirements. 
 123.  Id. 
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Mobility, Rockstar/Bidco and Apple/Novell mergers.124 These three leading 
cases serve to display such divergence. In the Google-Motorola Mobility 
merger, more than 17,000 issued patents and 6,800 applications included 
SEPs relevant to wireless devices were at stake.125 In the Rockstar/Bidco, a 
partnership including RIM, Microsoft and Apple, was formed to acquire 
patents at the Nortel bankruptcy auction, and to license and distribute them 
to certain partners.126 Many of these patents were SEPS with licensing 
commitments through SSOs.127 Finally, in the Apple/Novell merger, Apple 
also acquired patents with cross-licensing commitments on a royalty-free 
basis from Novell-CPTN to be used in the Linux system.128 In these three 
transactions, the DOJ determined that competition would unlikely decrease 
and that market dynamics would not change significantly.129 In this regard, 
it may be concluded that the DOJ might be reconsidering other policy tool 
options to deal with SEP issues in the context of antitrust. 
2.  The European Union 
The EU is no alien to the use of merger control to review IP related 
issues affecting the merging parties. In 2011, Google filed a transaction 
before the EC merger control directorate. whereby it planned to acquire 
Motorola Mobility.130 As part of the deal, Google proposed to acquire 
Motorola’s patent portfolio amounting to approximately 7,000 to 8,000 
patents.131 The EC cleared the transaction, but not without reviewing 
Motorola Mobility’s patent portfolio.132 Eventually, in the words of Almunia, 
“[W]e concluded that Google’s acquisition of Motorola’s large portfolio of 
standard-essential patents for mobile devices would not lead the merged 
entity to foreclose other suppliers, also thanks to existing FRAND 
 
 124.  See Press Release, DOJ, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its 
Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and 
the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (RIM) 
of certain Nortel Networks Corporation patents, and the acquisition by Apple of certain Novell Inc. 
patents (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-
division-its-decision-close-its-investigations. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Merger Procedure Article 6(1)(b) Decision (EC), Case No COMP/M.6381, Google/Motorola 
Mobility (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
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commitments.”133 Notwithstanding the clearance of Google’s deal, in April 
2014, the EC found that Motorola Mobility was in breach of EU competition 
law over its use of SEPs.134 
The deal involving Microsoft and Nokia is another example of how the 
EC could use the merger review procedures to scrutinize companies’ IP 
strategies. The merger was unconditionally cleared, but not without a debate 
over the possibility of Nokia being able to extract higher returns from this 
portfolio. In relation to the IP involved the transaction, the EC considered 
that: 
[A]ny possible competition concerns, which might arise from the conduct 
of Nokia, following the transaction, in the licensing of the patent portfolio 
for smart mobile devices which it has retained falls outside the scope of 
the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission cannot take account of such 
concerns in the assessment of the current transaction. Indeed, Nokia is the 
seller whereas the Commission’s investigation relates to the merged 
entity. However, the Commission will remain vigilant and closely monitor 
Nokia’s post-merger licensing practices under EU antitrust rules, in 
particular Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) that prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position.135 
In relation to the approach taken by the EC, Commissioner Almunia publicly 
stated “If Nokia were to take illegal advantage of its patents in the future, we 
will open an antitrust case—but I sincerely hope we will not have to.”136 
III.  THE IMPACT OF THE USE OF DIFFERENT POLICY TOOLS 
Based on the foregoing, a few broad trends with respect to competition 
law’s treatment of FRAND encumbered SEPs are discernible. First, in the 
United States and in light of the eBay decision, there is movement towards 
equitable analysis of such cases—a shift from the previous trend of 
automatic injunctions in favor of patent holders and an increasing desire 
from antitrust agencies to have a word on this subject. Next, there is 
increasing propensity to view SEP related patents issues as an antitrust 
violation leading to a review on a post facto basis by the relevant competition 
courts, notably in the EU. Finally, another palpable trend is the 
 
 133.  See Press Release, Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, EC,  Almunia Speech on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
1042_en.htm. 
 134.  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-489_en.htm 
 135.   http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1210_en.htm 
 136.  See Press Release, Joaquin Almunia, Vice President, EC,  Almunia Speech on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Policy (Dec. 9, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
1042_en.htm. 
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predisposition of the EU and US competition authorities to consider 
patent/SEP issues at the merger review stage. 
In isolation, these developments may seem innocuous; however, given 
the widening of the international competition canvas, each of these moves 
may have significant internal reverberations.  This is particularly the case 
when mature competition authorities’ developments serve to validate 
emerging competition systems’ opportunistic decisions, to the detriment of 
bona fide business interests. The effects of the above cases considered as a 
sum reveal a trend that has diverse impacts at national, transatlantic and 
international levels. These conclusions are easier understood when 
responding to questions on its bearings on the institutional design of 
agencies, the cooperation between agencies and eventually the international 
dimension of such decisions. 
A.  National Impact and the Effect on Institutional Design 
An increasing amount of attention is being devoted to the impact of 
institutional design in the policy outcomes of competition agencies.  
Similarly, it is important to note the competition agencies’ case outcomes 
also may have an impact on the institutional design and lifecycle of the 
agencies The comparison of the FTC and DOJ cases included in part two of 
this paper discloses that either agency has opted for a different policy tool to 
advance its agenda relating to antitrust in the IP arena.  In this respect, 
whereas to a certain extent the DOJ seems to prefer to rely on advocacy, the 
FTC has opted to continue with its enforcement agenda. 
In view of the above, the institutional implications cannot to be ignored. 
On the one hand, from a business perspective, it is easy to imagine that 
corporations with patent portfolios will start developing a preference for the 
DOJ review of transactions. When choosing enforcement as a preferred 
policy tool to advance an antitrust agenda in the IP field, the FTC is 
simultaneously imposing a deterrence effect towards its institution from a 
market perspective. This is due to the fact that corporations understand the 
outcome of the FTC cases as a decision of the agency, using its merger 
review mandate to take advantage of businesses and require an entire menu 
of potential antitrust issues for the agency to decide.137 
On the other hand, the existence of the FTC is based principally on its 
expertise, i.e. consumer protection and antitrust. Some politicians may 
 
 137.  Dina Kallay, Director, I.P. & Competition at Ericsson. Inc., New Considerations in I.P. - 
Antitrust and Negotiating Standard Essential Patents, Global Competitive Rev., 3rd Annual Antitrust 
Leaders Forum (Feb. 7, 2014). 
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understand a policy tool that extends the arms of antitrust into other domains, 
as if the FTC is overarching its institutional mandate. Against this 
background, the choice of enforcement as a policy tool in the field of IP risks 
the FTC no longer being considered the agency exclusively dedicated to the 
implementation of antitrust and consumer protection commands.  
Consequently, it is less likely that courts will easily grant deference to the 
agency’s decisions, particularly if the statutory command used to that end is 
§ 5 of the FTC Act.138 As such, the FTC might be imposing more difficulties 
before courts to hear antitrust and consumer core cases by imposing higher 
barriers to succeed in its core policy outcomes. 
Finally, in a context where institutional duplicities are at the heart of 
public expenditure cuts, and taking into consideration that most competition 
systems count with a single agency, the FTC’s policy tool does not help its 
future. Recent trends in institutional design of agencies point to the 
conclusion that multiagency competition systems are moving towards the 
unification of agencies.139 Eventually, if the United States follows the former 
trend, the agency with the best reputation among the different stakeholders 
(congress, private sector, etc.) will survive. 
B.  Transatlantic Impact and the Effect on Dynamic Developments 
Recent developments have shifted the original idea of antitrust law 
being inherently in conflict with IP. In fact, the current view offers the notion 
that IP and antitrust are complementary in encouraging innovation, industry 
and competition. In line with this current view, there seems to be 
convergence between the United States and the EU with respect to the idea 
that antitrust policy has a role to play in relation to certain IP matters, and 
particularly addresses patent hold up. Nonetheless, there seems to still be 
some divergence with regards to the choice of policy tool to do so. 
As previously stated, the EU has historically been the jurisdiction 
focusing on enforcement rather than litigation from an antitrust policy 
perspective. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the EC has used competition 
related legislation to decide on cases potentially involving hold-ups. 
Differently, the US has repeatedly stated that antitrust law and policy should 
not constrain the legitimate exercise of IP rights by for example stating 
 
 138.  William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929 (2010). 
 139.  See William E.Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, The George Washington University, 
UNCTAD-Benchmarking Competition Authorities: A Global Survey of Major Institutional 
Characteristics, UNCTAD-RPP Meeting (July 7, 2013),  
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/RPP2013_LopezGaldos_en.pdf. 
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that”we need to ensure that the application of antitrust laws does not 
illegitimately stifle innovation and creation by condemning pro-competitive 
activities that would maximize incentives for investments or efficiency-
maximizing business arrangements.”140 As a result, US policy tools other 
than enforcement, such as advocacy, have played a key role in shaping its 
competition system. 
The evolution of US antitrust laws is characterized as the pursuit of 
consumer welfare by relying on accumulated knowledge and economic 
analysis embedded in the “rule of reason” analytical framework. It is, in fact, 
the rule of reason and its permeability to economic analysis that has allowed 
U.S. antitrust to evolve throughout the years. The apparent shift in the US 
tradition towards preferring enforcement tools with regards to hold-ups may 
eventually impact the dynamic nature of US antitrust, to the benefit of more 
stagnant EU competition developments. The continuation of an enforcement 
policy vis-à-vis SEPs in the United States lacking substantial economic 
analysis may hinder the evolution of a more sophisticated approach to the 
matters and to the benefit of consumers. Furthermore, the consequence of 
opting for a more European-styled policy tool reassures the EU’s 
enforcement nature competition system to the detriment of the US advocacy 
agenda. 
C.  International Impact and the Effect in Emerging Competition Systems 
In 2006, China announced the 2020 Plan, which contained a strategy to 
move from a “Made in China” to a “Made by China” economy.141 The 2020 
Plan included the objective to invest 2.5% of the Chinese GDP in research 
and development.142 It is expected that by 2020, key Chinese companies (e.g., 
Haier, Legend, Huawei, Tsingdao) will set up innovation centers to boost 
technological transformation.143 In fact, by 2006, the Chinese government 
already provided a fund of 700 million yuan to boost protection of Chinese 
 
 140.  Remarks by Makan Delrahim Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division U.S. 
Department of Justice Presented at American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting 
Washington, D.C. “US and EU Approaches to the Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual Property Licensing: 
Observations from the Enforcement Perspective”, 1 April, 2004. 
 141.  See, e.g., News Update, CAS Clarifies Its Development Vision in the Next 15 Years, CHINESE 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (Mar. 30, 2006), http://english.cas.cn/; China is considering investments of up to 
$1.5 trillion over five years in seven strategic industries, NEXT BIG FUTURE (Dec. 5, 2010), 
http://nextbigfuture.com/2010/12/china-is-considering-investments-of-up.html. 
 142.  See, e.g., Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-Year Science and 
Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006 (Magazine), at 38. 
 143.   See George S. Yip, Bruce McKern, China’s Next Strategic Advantage: From Imitation to 
Innovation, MIT Press, 2016. 
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brands and patents.144 However, the 2020 Plan and its success are at 
crossroads with China’s antitrust policy adopted in 2008. 
Along with other nascent competition regimes, China’s competition law 
establishes a competition system with a multiplicity of goals, such as 
consumer welfare or the healthy development of the socialist market 
economy.145 One of the peculiarities of the Chinese competition regime is 
that the competition law includes some provisions that touch upon IPR 
policies. In particular, Article 55 states, 
[T]his law shall not apply to the conduct of undertakings to exercise their 
intellectual property rights in accordance with the relevant laws and 
regulations on intellectual property rights; however, this Law shall apply  
to the conduct of undertakings to eliminate or restrict market competition 
by abusing their intellectual property rights’.146 
In 2012, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) 
clarified that abuses of IPRs would fall under the general prohibitions of 
competition, such as anticompetitive agreements or mergers and abuse of 
dominance.147 
In this context, it may not be far from the truth to conclude that recent 
developments in more mature competition regimes (viz. EU and United 
States) relating to the intersection of IPR policies and competition laws 
might be sending a wrong message to other regimes. For instance, the recent 
decisions of U.S. and EU authorities could be interpreted as a validation to 
the Chinese regime by confirming that competition provisions are good tools 
to shape IPR Policies. 
The use of antitrust to police contractual opportunism is seen by some 
Chinese corporations as a window of opportunity to export this use of 
antitrust to enable the Chinese corporations to obtain IP related advantages 
from SEP owners. Illustratively, ZTE’s welcomed the Advocate General’s 
resolution, as it considers that 
[t]his opinion is a further step towards clarifying that the EC law restricts 
the availability of injunctions under SEPs. It makes clear that if the patent 
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holder has given a FRAND licensing commitment, seeking an injunction 
to leverage licensing deals may have the effect of distorting 
competition.’148 In particular Guo Xiaoming, Chief Legal Officer of ZTE, 
said: ‘ZTE is delighted that the position of the Advocate General is so 
closely aligned with its own position on injunctions under SEPs. There 
seems to be a convergence between ZTE’s and the AG’s approaches 
towards a good compromise between rewarding innovation whilst not 
unfairly blocking companies from providing standard compatible 
products. The position of the AG would also reduce the ability of NPEs to 
act unfairly in negotiations with technology companies.’149 
In the merger field, the decision of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
on Google’s acquisition on Motorola Mobility illustrates this 
phenomenon.150 Whereas the merger was reviewed by several jurisdictions 
including the USA and the EU, only China conditionally approved the 
transaction. The remedy consisted of obliging Google to license, free of 
charge, Android for a period of five years to the benefit of the Chinese 
Android platform and in order to honor Motorola’s existing FRAND 
commitments. 151 
In the context of monopoly regulation, China is willing to impose the 
broadest essential facility doctrine existing worldwide. In addition, it is 
worth noting that the Chinese state upholds the decisions on standard 
setting.152 The wording of the Draft IP Enforcement Regulation states that it 
is a competition violation to refuse to license an IPR that is an essential 
facility.153 
This use of antitrust laws to justify protectionist IPR policies could be 
particularly important in view of the Plan 2020. On the one hand, China has 
presented itself with a solid commitment to modernize its IPR policies, boost 
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research and development, and become a leading reference in innovation. On 
the other hand, for those sectors or markets where the 2020 Plan fails to 
succeed, the Chinese government could still protect its companies from 
foreign IPRs by using its competition law. And this could be particularly 
important in the FRAND arena, where worldwide prices and negotiating 
dynamics may stoop to the bottom.154 Consequently, Chinese antitrust 
authorities could strengthen an anti-patent policy disguised under 
international competition practices to the detriment of others, but not for 
Chinese companies. 
The above-described scenario is a strategy that would make Chinese 
corporations benefit from the positive outcomes of market competition and 
develop their business under the safety net of competition law. The Chinese 
government could use this strategy when Chinese corporations cannot 
meritoriously win in the free market game. This is the main reason why 
Western and more mature competition systems should consider recent 
developments in those cases that deal with the intersection of IP and 
competition laws, since a narrow view of the challenges faced internally 
might be preventing authorities from observing that it is not just the elephant 
in the room that needs to be tamed, but the hungry dragon next door. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Antitrust agencies, notably including more mature ones, count on 
different policy tools to advance antitrust agendas with the objective of 
maximizing consumer welfare. Some of these policy tools include advocacy 
or enforcement actions. Nonetheless, the misinterpretation of the antitrust 
norms and misuse of such policy tools may play against consumer welfare. 
It seems that antitrust agencies both in the United States and EU have a 
renewed interest to address SEPs related concerns with a particular focus on 
patent hold ups. From a U.S. perspective, while the increasing advocacy 
efforts are welcome, the enforcement trend lead by the FTC should sound 
alarm bells. Similarly, the EU seems to be going down a perilous path, too. 
In particular, the United States’ latest enforcement actions in the field 
of SEPs do not represent a smart institutional strategic decision. The 
expansive use of § 5 of the FTC Act to challenge patent hold-ups is likely to 
play against the FTC when seeking deference from courts in cases not related 
to IPRs. Further, the use of merger control provisions to advance the 
opportunity to review other antitrust concerns having nothing to do with the 
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merger and extort voluntary commitments will continue to turn the business 
community against the FTC. Eventually, the reputation of the FTC 
individually, and the U.S. competition system widely (including the DOJ), 
as a credible and leading regime might be negatively impacted. 
Finally, these enforcement decisions may set a bad precedent globally 
and create a motivated and self-centered agenda for any other competition 
system that wants to place vested interests of SEP owners above public 
welfare. Living in a global pond, mature agencies need to be wary of how 
they row their boats, for they cannot later complain that others, following 
their lead, are playing unfairly. 
 
